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Abstract
Recommendation systems often face exploration-exploitation tradeoffs: the system can only
learn about the desirability of new options by recommending them to some user. Such systems
can thus be modeled as multi-armed bandit settings; however, users are self-interested and
cannot be made to follow recommendations. We ask whether exploration can nevertheless be
performed in a way that scrupulously respects agents’ interests—i.e., by a system that acts as
a fiduciary. More formally, we introduce a model in which a recommendation system faces an
exploration-exploitation tradeoff under the constraint that it can never recommend any action
that it knows yields lower reward in expectation than an agent would achieve if it acted alone.
Our main contribution is a positive result: an asymptotically optimal, incentive compatible, and
ex-ante individually rational recommendation algorithm.
1 Introduction
Multi-armed bandits (henceforth MABs) [9, 11] is a well-studied problem domain in online learning.
In that setting, several arms (i.e., actions) are available to a planner; each arm is associated with an
unknown reward distribution, from which rewards are sampled independently each time the arm is
pulled. The planner selects arms sequentially, aiming to maximize her sum of rewards. This often
involves a tradeoff between exploiting arms that have been observed to yield good rewards and
exploring arms that could yield even higher rewards. Many variations of this model exist, including
stochastic [1, 21], Bayesian [2], contextual [13, 29], adversarial [3] and non-stationary [8, 23] bandits.
This paper considers a setting motivated by recommender systems. Such systems suggest actions
to agents based on a set of current beliefs and assess agents’ experiences to update these beliefs.
For instance, in navigation applications (e.g., Waze; Google maps) the system recommends routes
to drivers based on beliefs about current traffic congestion. The planner’s objective is to minimize
users’ average travel time. The system cannot be sure of the congestion on a road segment that
no agents have recently traversed; thus, navigation systems offer the best known route most of the
time and explore occasionally. Of course, users are not eager to perform such exploration; they are
self-interested in the sense that they care more about minimizing their own travel times than they
do about conducting surveillance about traffic conditions for the system.
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A recent line of work [22, 26], inspired by the viewpoint of algorithmic mechanism design [27, 28],
deals with that challenge by incentivizing exploration—that is, setting up the system in such a way
that no user would ever rationally choose to decline an action that was recommended to him. The
key reason that it is possible to achieve this property while still performing a sufficient amount of
exploration is that the planner has more information than the agents. At each point in time, each
agent holds beliefs about the arms’ reward distributions; the planner has the same information, but
also knows about all of the arms previously pulled and the rewards obtained in each case. More
specifically, Kremer et al. [22] consider a restricted setting and devise an MAB algorithm that is
incentive compatible (IC), meaning that whenever the algorithm recommends arm i to an agent,
the best response of the agent is to select arm i.
Although this approach explicitly reasons about agents’ incentives, it does not treat agents
fairly : agents who are asked to explore receive lower expected rewards. More precisely, these IC
MAB algorithms reach optimality (in the static setting) or minimize regret (in the online setting) by
intentionally providing (a priori) sub-optimal recommendations to some of the agents. In particular,
such IC MAB algorithms lead agents astray from the default arm— the a priori superior arm, which
would be every agent’s rational choice in the absence both of knowledge of other agents’ experiences
and of a trusted recommendation. Thus, it would be natural for agents to see the recommendations
of such IC MAB algorithms as a betrayal of trust; they might ask “if you believed that what
you recommended to me was worse than what I would have picked without your help, why did
you recommend it?” Of course, the scale of this problem gets worse as the importance of the
recommendation to the agent increases. At the extreme end of the spectrum, it would clearly be
unethical for a doctor to recommend a treatment to a patient that she considers sub-optimal, even
if doing so would lead to better medical outcomes for society as a whole. Similarly, nobody wants
a financial advisor who occasionally recommends stocks about which she has low confidence in
order to improve her predictive model. Indeed, in many domains such behavior is illegal: e.g., in
jurisdictions where a financial advisor has a fiduciary duty to her clients, she is legally required to
act at all times for the sole benefit of her clients.
Our contribution In this paper we introduce the idea of fiduciary bandits. We explore a def-
inition of a recommender’s fiduciary duty that we call ex-ante individual rationality (EAIR). A
mechanism is EAIR if any probability distribution over arms that it selects has expected reward
that is always at least as great as the reward of the default arm, both calculated based on the rec-
ommender’s knowledge (which may be more extensive than that of agents). This means that, while
it is possible for the mechanism to sample a recommendation from the distribution that is a priori
inferior to the default arm, the agent receiving the recommendation is nevertheless guaranteed to
realize expected reward weakly greater than that offered by the default arm—independently from
the other agents and their recommendations. Satisfying this requirement makes a MAB algorithm
more appealing to agents; we foresee that in some domains, such a requirement might be imposed
as fairness constraints by authorities.
Algorithmically, we focus on constructing an optimal EAIR mechanism that also satisfies the IC
requirement. Our model is similar to that of Kremer et al. [22], but with K ≥ 2 arms and uniform
agent arrival.1 In particular, the planner and the agents have (the same) Bayesian prior over the
rewards of the arms, which are fixed but initially unknown. The main technical contribution of
1The assumption of uniform arrival is only required for incentive compatibility; thus, the algorithms we propose
in this paper are asymptotically optimal and IR regardless of the agent arrival distribution.
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this paper is an IC and EAIR mechanism, which obtains the highest possible social welfare by an
ex-ante IR mechanism up to a factor of o( 1n), where n is the number of agents. The optimality of
our mechanism, which we term Fiduciary Explore & Exploit (FEE) and outline as Algorithm 1,
follows from a careful construction of the exploration phase. Our analysis uses an intrinsic property
of the setting, which is further elaborated in Theorem 1.
To complement this analysis, we also investigate the more demanding concept of ex-post indi-
vidual rationality (EPIR). The EPIR condition requires that a recommended arm must never be a
priori inferior to the default arm given the planner’s knowledge. The two requirements differ in the
guarantees that they provide to agents and correspondingly allow the system different degrees of
freedom in performing exploration. We design an asymptotically optimal IC and EPIR mechanism
and analyze the social welfare cost of adopting both EAIR and EPIR mechanisms.
Related work Background on MABs can be found in Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi [11] and a recent
survey [9]. Kremer et al. [22] is the first work of which we are aware that investigated the problem
of incentivizing exploration. The authors considered two deterministic arms, a prior known both to
the agents and the planner, and an arrival order that is common knowledge among all agents, and
presented an optimal IC mechanism. Cohen and Mansour [14] extended this optimality result to
several arms under further assumptions. This setting has also been extended to regret minimization
[26], social networks [4, 5], and heterogeneous agents [12, 19]. All of this literature disallows paying
agents; monetary incentives for exploration are discussed in e.g., [12, 16]. None of this work
considers an individual rationality constraint as we do here.
Our work also contributes to the growing body of work on fairness in Machine Learning [7, 15,
18, 24]. In the context of MABs, some recent work focuses on fairness in the sense of treating
arms fairly. In particular, Liu et al. [25] aim at treating similar arms similarly and Joseph et al.
[20] demand that a worse arm is never favored over a better one despite a learning algorithm’s
uncertainty over the true payoffs. Finally, we note that the EAIR requirement we impose—that
agents be guaranteed an expected reward at least as high as that offered by a default arm—is also
related to the burgeoning field of safe reinforcement learning [17].
2 Model
Let A = {a1, . . . aK} be a set of K arms (actions). The rewards are deterministic but initially
unknown: the reward of arm ai is a random variable Xi, and (Xi)
K
i=1 are mutually independent.
We denote by Ri the observed value of Xi. Further, we denote by µi the expected value of Xi, and
assume for notational convenience that µ1 ≥ · · · ≥ µK . We also make the simplifying assumption
that the rewards (Xi)
K
i=1 are fully supported on the set [H] = {1, . . . ,H}, and refer to the continuous
case in Section 5.
The n agents arrive in a random order, σ : {1, . . . , n} → {1, . . . , n}, where σ is selected uniformly
at random from the set of all permutations. Let j denote an agent and l denote a stage (i.e., a
position in the ordering). The proposition l = σ(j) asserts that agent j arrived at stage l. In what
follows, we refer to agents according to the (random) stage at which they arrive, and not according
to their names.2 We denote by al the action of the agent arriving at stage l (not the action of
2The effect of this construction is that, unlike in the work of Kremer et al. [22], agents cannot infer their positions
in the ordering from their names. As a result, as we show in the appendix, in our setting a mechanism that first
explores all arms and then exploits the best arm is IC and asymptotically optimal.
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agent l). The reward of the agent arriving at stage l is denoted by Rl, and is a function of the arm
she chooses. For instance, by selecting arm ar the agent obtains R
l(ar) = Xr. Each agent aims at
maximizing her payoff. Agents are fully aware of the distribution of (Xi)
K
i=1.
A mechanism is a recommendation engine that interacts with agents. The input for the mech-
anism at stage l is the sequence of arms pulled and rewards received by the previous l − 1 agents.
The output of the mechanism is a recommended arm for agent l. Formally, a mechanism is a
function M :
⋃n
l=1 (A× R+)
l−1 → ∆(A); of course, we can also define a deterministic notion that
maps simply to A. The mechanism makes action recommendations, but cannot compel agents to
follow these recommendations. We say that a mechanism is incentive compatible (IC) when follow-
ing its recommendations constitutes an equilibrium3: that is, when given a recommendation and
given that others follow their own recommendations, an agent’s best response is to follow her own
recommendation.
Definition 1 (Incentive Compatibility). A mechanism M is incentive compatible (IC) if ∀l ∈
{1, . . . , n}, for every history h = (h1, . . . , hl−1) ∈ (A× R+)
l−1 and for all actions ar, ai ∈ A,
E(Rl(ar) |M(h) = r) = E(Xr |M(h) = r) ≥ E(Xi|M(h) = r) = E(R
l(ai)|M(h) = r).
The mechanism has a global objective, which is to maximize agents’ social welfare
∑n
l=1R
l(al).
When a mechanism M is IC, we can also talk about the mechanism’s (expected) social welfare
under the assumption that the agents follow its recommendations, :
SW (M) = E
(
1
n
n∑
l=1
XM(hl)
)
. (1)
A mechanism M∗ is said to be optimal w.r.t. the problem parameters if for every other mechanism
M ′ it holds that SW (M∗) ≥ SW (M ′). A mechanism M∗ is asymptotically optimal if, for every
“large enough” number of agents n greater than some number n′, the social welfare of the agents
under M∗ is at most o( 1n) away from the social welfare attained by the best possible mechanism
for n agents (that is, if for every other mechanism M ′ it holds that SW (M∗) ≥ SW (M ′)− o( 1n)).
As elaborated above, in this paper we focus on mechanisms that are individually rational. Since
agents are aware of the distributions (Xi)
K
i=1, they also know that µ1 = maxi µi; hence, we shall
assume that every agent’s default action is a1. As a result, a fiduciary mechanism should guarantee
each agent at least the reward provided by action a1. We now formally define this notion, using
the property of ex-ante individual rationality (EAIR).
Definition 2 (Ex-Ante Individual Rationality). A mechanism M is ex-ante individually rational
(EAIR) if for every agent l ∈ {1, . . . , n}, every value R1 in the support of X1, and every history
h = (h1, . . . , hl−1) ∈ (A×R+)
l−1,
K∑
r=1
Pr (M(h) = r | h)E(Xr | h) ≥ R1. (2)
Due to the mutual independence assumption, we must have E(Xr | h) = Rr if arm ar was
observed under the history h and E(Xr | h) = µr otherwise. An EAIR mechanism must select a
portfolio of arms with expected reward never inferior to the reward obtained for a1. We also discuss
a more strict form of rationality, namely ex-post individual rationality (EPIR) in Section 4.
3This is done for ease of presentation. The mechanisms in this paper can be modified to offer dominant strategies
to agents.
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2.1 Example
We now give an example to illustrate our setting and to familiarize the reader with our notation.
Consider K = 3 arms, H = 50 and Xi ∼ Uni{1, . . . , 10(K− i+1)} for i ∈ {1, . . . ,K}; thus µ1 = 15,
µ2 = 10, and µ3 = 5. As always, a1 is the default arm. To satisfy EAIR, a mechanism should
recommend a1 to the first agent, since EAIR requires that the expected value of any recommenda-
tion should weakly exceed R1. Let h1 = (a1, R1) be the history after the first agent. Now, we have
three different cases. First, if R1 > µ2 = 10, we know that E(X2 | h1) < R1 and E(X3 | h1) < R1;
therefore, an EAIR mechanism can never explore any other arm, since any distribution over {a2, a3}
would violate Inequality (2). Second, if R1 ≤ µ3 = 5, then E(X2 | h1) ≥ R1 and E(X3 | h1) ≥ R1,
and hence an EAIR mechanism can explore both a2 and a3.
The third and most interesting case is where µ3 < R1 ≤ µ2, as when R1 = 8. In this case, arm a3
could only be recommended through a portfolio. An EAIR mechanism could select any distribution
over {a2, a3} that satisfies Inequality (2): any p ∈ [0, 1] such that p · µ2 + (1 − p) · µ3 ≥ R1. This
means that an EAIR mechanism can potentially explore arm a3, yielding higher expected social
welfare overall than simply recommending a non-inferior arm deterministically.
3 Asymptotically Optimal IC-EAIR Mechanism
In this section we present the main technical contribution of this paper: a mechanism that asymp-
totically optimally balances the explore-exploit tradeoff while satisfying both EAIR and incentive
compatibility. The mechanism, which we term Fiduciary Explore & Exploit (FEE), is described
as Algorithm 1. FEE is an event-based protocol that triggers every time an agent arrives. We
now give an overview of FEE, focusing on the case where all agents adopt the recommendation of
the mediator; this is reasonable because we will go on to show that FEE is IC.4 We explain the
algorithm’s exploration phase in Subsection 3.1, describe the overall algorithm in Subsection 3.2,
and prove the algorithm’s formal guarantees in Subsection 3.3.
FEE is composed of three phases: primary exploration (Lines 1–6), secondary exploration (Lines
7–19), and exploitation (Lines 20). During the primary exploration phase, the mechanism compares
the default arm a1 to whichever other arms are permitted by the individual rationality constraint.
This turns out to be challenging for two reasons. First, the order in which arms are explored matters;
tackling them in the wrong order can reduce the set of arms that can be considered overall. Second,
it is nontrivial to search in the continuous space of probability distributions over arms. To address
this latter issue, we present a key lemma that allows us to use dynamic programming and find the
optimal exploration policy in time O(K2H32K). Because we expect K either to be fixed or to be
significantly smaller than n,H, this policy is computationally efficient. Moreover, we note that the
optimal exploration policy can be computed offline prior to the agents’ arrival.
The primary exploration phase terminates in one of two scenarios: either the reward R1 of arm
a1 is the best that was observed and thus no other arm could be explored (as in our example when
R1 > 10, or when R1 = 8 and exploring a2 yielded R2 ≤ R1 and thus a3 could not be explored),
or another arm ai was found to be superior to a1: i.e., an arm ai was observed for which Ri > R1.
In the latter case, the mechanism gains the option of conducting a secondary exploration, using
arm ai to investigate all the arms that were not explored in the primary exploration phase. The
4Nevertheless, we add for completeness that in case one or more agents deviate from her recommendation, the
algorithm would always recommend the first arm a1 from that moment on.
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third and final phase—to which we must proceed directly after the primary exploration phase if
that phase does not identify an arm superior to the default arm—is to exploit the most rewarding
arm observed.
3.1 Primary Exploration Phase
Performing primary exploration optimally requires solving a planning problem; it is a challenging
one, because it involves a continuous action space and a number of states exponential in K and H.
We approach this task as a Goal Markov Decision Process (GMDP) (see, e.g., [6]) that abstracts
everything but pure exploration. In our GMDP encoding, all terminal states fall into one of two
categories. The first category is histories that lead to pure exploitation of a1, which can arise either
because EAIR permits no arm to be explored or because all explored arms yield rewards inferior to
the observed R1; the second is histories in which an arm superior to a1 was found. Non-terminal
states thus represent histories in which it is still permissible for some arms to be explored. The
set of actions in each non-terminal state is the set of distributions over the non-observed arms (i.e.,
portfolios) corresponding to the history represented in that state, which satisfy the EAIR condition.
The transition probabilities encode the probability of choosing each candidate arm from a portfolio;
observe that the rewards of each arm are fixed, so this is not a source of additional randomness in
our model. GMDP rewards are given in terminal nodes only: either the observed R1 if no superior
arm was found or the expected value of the maximum between the superior reward discovered and
the maximal reward of all unobserved arms (since in this case, as we show later on, the mechanism
is able to explore all arms w.h.p. during the secondary exploration phase).
Formally, the GMDP is a tuple 〈S,A,P,R〉, where
• S is a finite set of states. Each state s is a pair (O,U), where O ⊆ {(a, c) | a ∈ A, c ∈ H}
is the set of arm-reward pairs that have been observed so far, with each a appearing at most
once in O (since rewards from the arms are deterministic): for every (O,U) and every a ∈ A,
|{c | (a, c) ∈ O}| ≤ 1. U ⊆ A is the set of arms not yet explored. The initial state is thus
s0 = (∅, A). For every non-empty
5 set of pairs O we define α(O) to be the reward observed for
arm a1, and β(O) = maxc:∃a,(a,c)∈O c to be the maximal reward observed.
• A =
⋃
s∈S As is an infinite set of actions. For each s = (O,U) ∈ S, As is defined as follows:
1. If s = s0, then As0 = ∆({a1}): i.e., a deterministic selection of a1.
2. Else, if α(O) < β(O), then As = ∅. This condition implies that we can move to secondary
exploration.
3. Otherwise, As is a subset of ∆(U), such that p ∈ As if and only if∑
ai∈U
p(ai)µai ≥ α(O). (3)
Notice that this resembles the EAIR condition given in Inequality (2). Moreover, the case
where none of the remaining arms have strong enough priors to allow exploration falls here
as a vacuous case of the above inequality.
We denote by ST the set of terminal states, namely ST = {s ∈ S | As = ∅}.
5Due to the construction, every non-empty O must contain (a1, c) for some c ∈ [H ].
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• P is the transition probability function. Let s = (O,U) ∈ S, and let s′ = (O′, U ′) such that
O′ = O ∪ {(ai, c)} and U
′ = U \ {ai} for some ai ∈ U, c ∈ [H]. Then, the transition probability
from s to s′ given an action p is defined by P(s′|s,p) = p(ai) Pr(Xi = c). If s
′ is some other state
that does not meet the conditions above, then let P(s′|s,p) = 0 for every p ∈ As.
• R : ST → R is the reward function, defined on terminal states only. For each terminal state
s = (O,U) ∈ ST ,
R(s) =
{
α(O) α(O) = β(O)
E
[
max
{
β(O),maxai′∈U Xi′)
}]
α(O) < β(O)
.
That is, when a1 was the highest-reward arm observed, the reward of a terminal state is α(O);
otherwise, it is the expectation of the maximum between β(O) and the highest reward of all
unobserved arms. The reward depends on unobserved arms since the secondary exploration
phase allows us to explore all these arms; hence, their values are also taken into account.
A policy π : (S × A)∗ × S → A is a function from all GMDP histories (sequences of states and
actions) and a current state to an action. A policy π is valid if for every history h and every
non-terminal state s, π(h, s) ∈ As. A policy π is stationary if for every two histories h, h
′ and a
state s, π(h, s) = π(h′, s). When discussing a stationary policy, we thus neglect its dependency on
h, writing π(s).
Given a policy π and a state s, we denote by W (π, s) the expected reward of π when initialized
from s, which is defined recursively from the terminal states:
W (π, s) =
{
R(s) if s ∈ ST∑
s′∈S P(s
′|s, π(s))W (π, s′) otherwise.
(4)
We now turn to our technical results. The following lemma shows that we can safely focus on
stationary policies that effectively operate on a significantly reduced state space.
Lemma 1. For every policy π there exists a stationary policy π′ such that (1) π′(s) = π′(s′) for
every pair of states s = (O,U) and s′ = (O′, U) with α(O) = α(O′) and β(O) = β(O′); and (2) for
every state s, W (π′, s) ≥W (π, s).
Lemma 1 tells us that there exists an optimal, stationary policy that selects the same action
in every pair of states that share the same unobserved set U and values α(O) and β(O), but are
distinguished in the O component. Thus, we do not need a set of states whose size depends on the
number of possible arm-reward observation histories: all we need to record is U , α(O) and β(O),
reducing the number of states to O(2KH2).
We still have one more challenge to overcome: the set of actions available in each state is
uncountable; hence, employing standard value iteration or policy iteration is infeasible. Instead,
we prove that there exists an optimal “simple” policy, which we denote π∗. Given two indices
i, r ∈ {2, . . . ,K}, we denote by pαir (for i 6= r) and by p
α
ii (for i = r) the distributions over
{a1, . . . , aK} such that
p
α
ir(a) =


|α−µr |
|α−µi|+|α−µr |
if a = ai
|α−µi|
|α−µi|+|α−µr |
if a = ar
0 otherwise
, pαii(a) =
{
1 if a = ai
0 otherwise
.
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When α = α(O) is clear from context, we omit it from the superscript. We are now ready to
describe the policy π∗, which we later prove to be optimal. For the initial state s0, π
∗(s0) = p11.
For every non-terminal state s = (O,U) ∈ S with s 6= so, π
∗(s) = pi∗r∗ such that
(i∗,r∗)∈ argmax
(i,r)∈U×U,
pir∈As
{(
1−
1i=r
2
)(
pir(i)
∑
s′∈S
P(s′|s,pii)W (π
∗,s′)+pir(r)
∑
s′∈S
P(s′|s,prr)W (π
∗,s′)
)}
.
The optimality of π∗ follows from a property that is formally proven in Theorem 1: any policy π
that satisfies the conditions of Lemma 1 can be presented as a mixture of policies that solely take
actions of the form (pir)i,r. As a result, we can improve π by taking the best such policy from that
mixture. We derive π∗ via dynamic programming, where the base cases are the set of terminal
states. For any other state, π∗(s) is the best action of the form pir as defined above, considering
all states that are reachable from s. While any policy π′ can be encoded as a weighted sum over
such “simple” policies, π∗ is the best one, and hence is optimal.
Theorem 1. For every valid policy π and every state s, it holds that W (π∗, s) ≥W (π, s).
Since our compressed state representation consists of O(2KH2) states, the computation of π∗
in each stage requires us to consider O(K2) candidate actions, each of which involves summation
of at most H + 1 summands; thus, π∗ can be computed in O(2KK2H3) time.
3.2 Intuitive Description of the Fiduciary Explore & Exploit Algorithm
We now present the FEE algorithm, stated formally as Algorithm 1. The primary exploration phase
(Lines 1–6) is based on the GMDP from the previous subsection. It is composed of computing π∗
and then producing recommendations according to its actions, each of which defines a distribution
over (at most) two actions. Let (U,O) denote the terminal state reached by π∗ (the primary
exploration selects a fresh arm in each stage; hence such a state is reached after at most K agents).
We then enter the secondary exploration phase. If β(O) = R1 then this phase is vacuous: no
distribution over the unobserved arms can satisfy the EAIR condition and/or all the observed arms
are inferior to arm a1. On the other hand, if β(O) > R1 (Line 7), we found an arm ar˜ with a
reward superior to R1, and can use it to explore all the remaining arms. For every ai ∈ U , the
mechanism operates as follows. If the probability of ai yielding a reward greater than ar˜ is zero,
we neglect it (Lines 11–13). Else, if µi ≥ R1, we recommend ai. This is manifested in the second
condition in Line 15. Otherwise, µi < R1. In this case, we select a distribution over {ar˜, ai} that
satisfies the EAIR condition and explore ai with the maximal possible probability, which is pr˜i(i).
As we show formally in the proof of Lemma 2, the probability of exploring ai in this case is at least
1
H , implying that after H tries in expectation the algorithm would succeed to explore ai.
Ultimately (Line 20), FEE recommends the best observed arm to all the remaining agents.
3.3 Algorithmic Guarantees
We begin by arguing that FEE is indeed EAIR.
Proposition 1. FEE satisfies the EAIR condition.
One more property FEE exhibits is IC. The next theorem shows that when there are enough
agents, the best action of each agent is to accept FEE’s recommendation. To present it, we introduce
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Algorithm 1 Fiduciary Explore & Exploit (FEE)
1: Initialize a GMDP instance 〈S,A,P,R〉, and
compute π∗.
2: Set s = (O,U) = (∅, A).
3: while s is not terminal do
4: Draw arm ai ∼ π
∗(s), recommend arm ai
and observe Ri.
5: O ← O ∪ {(ai, Ri)}, U ← U \ {ai}.
6: s← (O,U).
7: if β(O) > R1 then
8: while U is not empty do
9: Let ar˜ s.t. ar˜ ∈ argmaxar∈A\U Rr.
10: Select an arbitrary arm ai ∈ U .
11: if Pr(Xi > Rr˜) = 0 then
12: U ← U \ {ai} .
13: continue.
14: Draw Y ∼ Uni[0, 1].
15: if Y ≤ Rr˜−R1Rr˜−µi or µi ≥ R1 then
16: Recommend ai and observe Ri .
17: U ← U \ {ai} .
18: else
19: Recommend ar˜.
20: Recommend ai∗ ∈ argmaxai∈A\U Ri to all
agents.
the following quantity δ. Let δi = Pr(∀i
′ ∈ [K] \ {i} : Xi > Xi′). In words, δi is the probability
that arm ai is superior to all other arms. Clearly, if δi = 0 for some i, we can safely ignore that
arm and never explore it; therefore, δi > 0 for every arm ai. Finally, let δ = mini∈[K] δi. Theorem
2 implies that if there are poly(H,K, 1δ ) agents, then FEE is IC.
Theorem 2. If n ≥ 24H
2
δ max
{
K,H ln 4Hδ
}
, then FEE is IC.
We now move on to consider the social welfare of FEE. First, we show that the expected value
of π∗ at s0, denoted by W (π
∗, s0), upper bounds the social welfare of any EAIR mechanism.
Theorem 3. For every mechanism M which is EAIR, SW (M) ≤W (π∗, s0).
The proof proceeds by contradiction: given an EAIR mechanism M , we construct a series of
progressively-easier-to-analyze EAIR mechanisms with non-decreasing social welfare; we modify
the final mechanism by granting it oracular capabilities, making it violate the EAIR property and
yet preserving reducibility to a policy for the GMDP of Subsection 3.1. We then argue via the
optimality of π∗ that the oracle mechanism cannot obtain a social welfare greater than W (π∗, s0).
Next, we lower bound the social welfare of FEE by W (π∗, s0)− o(
1
n).
Lemma 2. SWn(FEE) ≥W (π
∗, s0)−
(K+1)H(W (π∗,s0)−µ1)
n .
The proof relies mainly on an argument that the primary and secondary explorations will not
be too long on average: after (K +1)H agents the mechanism is likely to begin exploiting. Noting
that the lower bound of Lemma 2 asymptotically approaches the upper bound of Theorem 3, we
conclude that FEE is asymptotically optimal.
4 Analysis
We now analyze the loss in social welfare imposed by the fiduciary constraint. Let OPT,OPTEAIR
denote the best asymptotic social welfare (w.r.t. some instance 〈K,A, (Xi)〉 and infinitely many
agents) achievable by an unconstrained mechanism and an EAIR mechanism, respectively.
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Proposition 2. For every K,H ∈ N such that K ≥ 2, there exists an instance 〈K,A, (Xi)〉 with
OPT
OPTEAIR
≥ H
(
1− e−
K
H
)
.
Proposition 2 shows that when K and H have the same magnitude, the ratio is on the order
of H, meaning that EAIR mechanisms perform poorly when a large number of different reward
values are possible. However, this result describes the worst case; it turns out that optimal EAIR
mechanisms have constant ratio under some reward distributions. For example, as we show in the
appendix, this ratio is at most 87 if Xi ∼ Uni{1, . . . H} for every i ∈ {1, . . . ,K}.
4.1 Ex-Post Individually Rational Mechanism
Notice that EAIR mechanisms guarantee each agent the value of the default arm, but only in
expectation. In this subsection, we propose a more strict form of individual rationality, ex-post
individual rationality (EPIR).
Definition 3 (Ex-Post Individual Rationality). A mechanism M is ex-post individually rational
(EPIR) if for every agent l ∈ {1, . . . , n}, every value R1 in the support of X1, every history h =
(h1, . . . , hl−1) ∈ (A× R+)
l−1, and every arm ar such that Pr(M(h) = r) > 0, it holds that E(Xr |
h) ≥ R1.
Satisfying EPIR means that the mechanism never recommends an arm that is a priori inferior
to arm a1. Noticeably, every EPIR mechanism is also EAIR, yet EPIR mechanisms are quite
conservative, since they can only explore arms that yield expected rewards of at least the value
R1 obtained for a1. We now provide the intuitive IC and EPIR mechanism MEPIR, which is also
asymptotically optimal. First, MEPIR explores a1, and observes R1. Then, it explores all arms ai
such that µi ≥ R1, one at each stage, in any arbitrary order. When no additional arm could be
explored (due to the EPIR condition), it exploits the best arm observed.
Proposition 3. MEPIR is IC, EPIR and asymptotically optimal among all EPIR mechanisms.
Next, we consider the cost of adopting the stricter EPIR condition rather than EAIR. Let
OPTEPIR be the best asymptotic social welfare achievable by an EPIR mechanism. As we show,
by providing a more strict fiduciary guarantee, the social welfare may be harmed by a factor of H.
Proposition 4. For every K,H ∈ N such that K ≥ 2, there exists an instance 〈K,A, (Xi)〉 with
OPTEAIR
OPTEPIR
≥ H+23
(
1− e−
K
H
)
.
5 Conclusions and Discussion
This paper introduces a model in which a recommender system must manage an exploration-
exploitation tradeoff under the constraint that it may never knowingly make a recommendation
that will yield lower reward than any individual agent would achieve if he/she acted without relying
on the system.
We see considerable scope for follow-up work. First, from a technical point of view, our algorith-
mic results are limited to discrete reward distributions. One possible future direction would be to
present an algorithm for the continuous case. More conceptually, we see natural extensions of EPIR
and EAIR to stochastic settings [10], either by assuming a prior and requiring the conditions w.r.t.
10
the posterior distribution or by requiring the conditions to hold with high probability. Moreover,
we are intrigued by non-stationary settings [8]—where e.g., rewards follow a Markov process—since
the planner would be able to sample a priori inferior arms with high probability assuming the
rewards change fast enough, thereby reducing regret.
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Algorithm 2 Optimal Policy for the GMDP
Input: an instance 〈S,A,P ,R〉.
Output: an optimal policy π∗.
1: For every non-terminal state s = (O,U) ∈ S,
• If s = s0, π∗(s) = p11.
• Else, set π∗(s) = pi∗r∗ such that
(i∗,r∗)∈ argmax
(i,r)∈U×U,
pir∈As
{(
1−
1i=r
2
)(
pir(i)
∑
s′∈S
P(s′|s,pii)W (π
∗,s′)+pir(r)
∑
s′∈S
P(s′|s,prr)W (π
∗,s′)
)}
. (5)
6 Omitted Proofs from Section 3.1
Proof of Lemma 1. The proof follows from Propositions 5 and 6 below.
Proposition 5. For every non-stationary policy π, there exists a stationary policy π′ such that for
every state s ∈ S, W (π, s) ≤W (π′, s).
Moreover, the following Proposition 6 implies that we can substantially reduce the state space
by disregarding the observed part O and
Proposition 6. For every stationary policy π there exists a stationary policy π′ such that:
1. π′(s) = π′(s′) for every pair of states s = (O,U), s′ = (O′, U) with α(O) = α(O′) and
β(O) = β(O′).
2. for every state s, W (π′, s) ≥W (π, s).
Proof of Proposition 5. Fix an arbitrary non-stationary policy π. We prove the claim by iter-
ating over all states in an increasing order of the number of elements in U . We use induction to
show that the constructed π′ indeed satisfies the assertion.
For every s = (O,U) ∈ S such that |U | = 1, i.e., U = {a}. If s is terminal, then As = ∅
and W (π, s) = W (π′, s) = α(O). Otherwise, the unique element in As is the action that assigns
probability 1 to a, and by setting π′(s) = π(s) we get W (π′, s) =W (π, s).
Assume that the assertion holds for every |U | ≤ j; namely, that W (π′, s) ≥ W (π, s) for all
s = (O,U) ∈ S with |U | ≤ j. We now prove the assertion for s = (O,U) ∈ S with |U | = j +1. If s
is a terminal state, then we are done. Else, since U and the support of each arm are finite, there
exists a finite number of possible histories that lead from s0 to s that we will mark as h1, . . . hw.
For every possible history h ∈ {h1, . . . hw}, π assigns an action ph ∈ As that (can) depend on the
history h. Let
p
∗ ∈ argmax
ph,h∈{h1,...,hw}
{∑
ai∈U
ph(ai)
∑
s′∈S
P(s′ | s,pii)W (π, s
′)
}
, (6)
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breaking ties arbitrarily. We set π′(s) = p∗ . Hence we get:
W (π, s) =
∑
s′∈S,h∈{h1,...hw}
Pr(h)P(s′ | s, π, h)W (π, s′)
=
∑
ai∈U,h∈{h1,...hw}
Pr(h)ph(ai)
∑
s′∈S
P(s′ | s,pii)W (π, s
′)
≤
∑
h∈{h1,...hw}
Pr(h) argmax
h∈{h1,...,hw}
{( ∑
ai∈U
ph(ai)
∑
s′∈S
P(s′ | s,pii)W (π, s
′)
)}
= 1 argmax
h∈{h1,...,hw}
{ ∑
ai∈U
ph(ai)
∑
s′∈S
P(s′ | s,pii)W (π, s
′)
}
= argmax
h∈{h1,...,hw}
{ ∑
ai∈U
ph(ai)
∑
s′∈S
P(s′ | s,pii)W (π
′, s′)
}
=
∑
ai∈U
p
∗(ai)
∑
s′∈S
P(s′ | s,pii)W (π
′, s′)
=W (π′, s);
hence, W (π, s) ≤W (π′, s). This concludes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 6. The proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 5, and is given for
completeness. Fix an arbitrary stationary policy π. We prove the claim by iterating over all
states in an increasing order of the number of elements in U . We use induction to show that the
constructed π′ indeed satisfies the assertion.
For every s = (O,U) ∈ S such that |U | = 1, i.e., U = {a}, if s is terminal then W (π, s) =
W (π′, s) = α(O). Otherwise, the unique element in As is the action that assigns probability 1 to
a; hence, by setting π′(s) = π(s) we get W (π′, s) =W (π, s).
Assume the assertion holds for every |U | ≤ j; namely, that W (π′, s) ≥ W (π, s) for all s =
(O,U) ∈ S with |U | ≤ j. Next, we prove the assertion for s = (O,U) ∈ S with |U | = j + 1. If
s is a terminal state, then we are done. Else, since the size of O and the support of each arm
are finite, there exists only a finite number of states with the same U and α, which we mark as
s = s0 = (O,U), s1 = (O
1, U), . . . sw = (O
w, U). For every state sj = (O
j, U), π assigns an action
psj ∈ As. Let
p
∗ ∈ argmax
psj
,j∈{0,1,...w}
{ ∑
ai∈U
psj(ai)
∑
s′∈S
P(s′ | s,pii)W (π
′, s′)
}
, (7)
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breaking ties arbitrarily. Next, set π′(s) = p∗. We have that
W (π, s) =
∑
s′∈S
P(s′ | s, π)W (π, s′)
=
∑
ai∈U
ps(ai)
∑
s′∈S
P(s′ | s,pii)W (π, s
′)
≤ argmax
sj∈{s0,s1,...,sw}
{( ∑
ai∈U
psj (ai)
∑
s′∈S
P(s′ | s,pii)W (π, s
′)
)}
≤ argmax
sj∈{s0,s1,...,sw}
{( ∑
ai∈U
psj (ai)
∑
s′∈S
P(s′ | s,pii)W (π
′, s′)
)}
=W (π′, s).
Proof of Theorem 1. Fix an arbitrary policy π. We prove the claim by iterating over all states in
an increasing order of the number of elements of U . We use induction to show that the constructed
π∗ indeed satisfies the assertion.
For every s = (O,U) ∈ S such that |U | = 1, the claim holds trivially. To see this, recall that if
s is terminal, As = ∅; otherwise, the unique element in As is the action that assigns probability 1
to the sole element in U . Either way, W (π∗, s) =W (π, s).
Assume the assertion holds for every |U | ≤ j; namely, that W (π∗, s) ≥ W (π, s) for all s =
(O,U) ∈ S with |U | ≤ j. If s is a terminal state, then we are done. Else, we shall make use of the
following claim, which shows that every action in As can be viewed as a weighted sum over the
elements of {pi,r ∈ As}.
Claim 1. For any s ∈ S and p ∈ As, there exist coefficients (zi,r)(ai,ar)∈U×U such that
• zi,r ≥ 0,
•
∑
(ai,ar)∈U×U
zi,r = 1, and
• p =
∑
pir∈As
zi,rpir.
The proof of the claim appears below this proof. In particular, Claim 1 suggests that π(s),
which is valid and thus π(s) ∈ As w.p. 1, can be presented as a weighted sum over all pairs
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pir ∈ As. Finally,
W (π, s) =
∑
s′∈S
P(s′ | s, π)W (π, s′)
=
∑
ai∈U
π(s)(ai)
∑
s′∈S
P(s′ | s,pii)W (π, s
′)
=
∑
ai∈U
∑
ar∈U :pir∈As
(
1−
1i=r
2
)
(zi,rpir(i) + zr,ipri(i))
∑
s′∈S
P(s′ | s,pii)W (π, s
′)
=
∑
ai∈U
∑
ar∈U :pir∈As
zi,r
(
1−
1i=r
2
)(
pir(i)
∑
s′∈S
P(s′ | s,pii)W (π, s
′) + pir(r)
∑
s′∈S
P(s′ | s,prr)W (π, s
′)
)
≤ argmax
ai,ar∈U,pir∈As
{(
1−
1i=r
2
)(
pir(i)
∑
s′∈S
P(s′|s,pii)W (π
∗, s′) + pir(r)
∑
s′∈S
P(s′|s,prr)W (π
∗, s′)
)}
,
=W (π∗, s),
where the last equality follows since π∗(s) = pi∗,r∗ and by the definition of (i
∗, r∗) given in Equation
(5). To sum, the constructed π∗ satisfies W (π, s) ≤W (π∗, s) for every state s.
Proof of Claim 1. To ease readability, we shall use the notation α = α(O) and di = |α− µi| in
this proof. Let s be an arbitrary state and p ∈ As be an arbitrary action. Notice that p could be
described as
p =
∑
ai∈U
vi · pii +
∑
pir∈As
zi,rpir, (8)
where vi = p(i) and zi,r = 0 for every ai, ar ∈ U such that pir ∈ As. We now describe a procedure
that shifts mass from the set (vi)i to (zi,r)i,r, while still satisfying the equality in Equation (8).
Each time we apply this procedure we decrease the value of one or more elements from (vi)i and
increase one or more elements from (zi,r)i,r by the same quantity. As a result, when it converges
(assuming that it does), namely when
∑
i vi = 0, we are guaranteed that all the conditions of the
claim hold. Importantly, throughout the course of this procedure, the following inequalities hold∑
ai∈U
vi · µi ≥ α
∑
ai∈U
vi. (9)
∑
ai∈U
vi +
∑
pir∈As
zi,r = 1. (10)
For the initial set of (vi)i Equations (9)-(10) trivially hold due to the way we initialize (vi)i and
since p ∈ As implies that ∑
ai∈U
p(i)µi ≥ α. (11)
In each step of the procedure, we use the prime notation to denote the coefficients in the end of
that step. The procedure operates as follows:
• If vi = 0 for every ai ∈ U , the claim holds.
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• Else, if for every i such that vi > 0, µi ≥ α, then for every i with vi > 0 set z
′
i,i = zi,i + vi
and set v′i = 0. Notice that after this change Equations (8)–(10) still hold.
• There exists i with µi < α and vi > 0. Consequently, since Equation (9) holds, there must
exist r such that µr > α and vr > 0. We divide the analysis into three sub-cases, depending
on the relation between drdi and
vi
vr
.
1. drdi >
vi
vr
: we replace vi, vr and zi,r with v
′
i , v
′
r and z
′
i,r such that v
′
i = 0 , v
′
r = vr−vi
di
dr
=
vr + vi −
vi
pir(i)
and z′i,r = zi,r + vi
di+dr
dr
= zi,r +
vi
pir(i)
. Clearly, after this modification
the new coefficients are non-negative. To show that Equation (8) still holds, we need to
show that p(i),p(r) can be decomposed using the new coefficients. Notice that
p(i) = vi +
∑
j:pi,j∈As
zi,jpij(i) +
∑
j:pj,i∈As
zj,ipji(i)
= v′i + vi + zi,rpir(i) +
∑
j:j 6=r,pi,j∈As
zi,jpij(i) +
∑
j:pj,i∈As
zj,ipji(i)
= v′i + vi
pir(i)
pir(i)
+ zi,rpir(i) +
∑
j:j 6=r,pi,j∈As
z′i,jpij(i) +
∑
j:pj,i∈As
z′j,ipji(i)
= v′i +
(
vi
pir(i)
+ zi,r
)
pir(i) +
∑
j:j 6=r,pi,j∈As
z′i,jpij(i) +
∑
j:pj,i∈As
z′j,ipji(i)
= v′i + z
′
i,rpir(i) +
∑
j:j 6=r,pi,j∈As
z′i,jpij(i) +
∑
j:pj,i∈As
z′j,ipji(i)
= v′i +
∑
j:pi,j∈As
z′i,jpij(i) +
∑
j:pj,i∈As
z′j,ipji(i).
Similarly,
p(r) = vr +
∑
j:pr,j∈As
zr,jprj(r) +
∑
j:pj,r∈As
zj,rpjr(r)
= v′r − vi +
vi
pir(i)
+ zi,rpir(r) +
∑
j:pr,j∈As
zr,jprj(r) +
∑
j:j 6=i,pj,r∈As
zj,rpjr(r)
= v′r +
vi(1− pir(i))
pir(i)
+ zi,rpir(r) +
∑
j:pr,j∈As
z′r,jprj(r) +
∑
j:j 6=i,pj,r∈As
z′j,rpjr(r)
= v′r +
vipir(r)
pir(i)
+ zi,rpir(r) +
∑
j:pr,j∈As
z′r,jprj(r) +
∑
j:j 6=i,pj,r∈As
z′j,rpjr(r)
= v′r +
(
vi
pir(i)
+ zi,r
)
pir(r) +
∑
j:pr,j∈As
z′r,jprj(r) +
∑
j:j 6=i,pj,r∈As
z′j,rpjr(r)
= v′r +
∑
j:pr,j∈As
z′r,jprj(r) +
∑
j:pj,r∈As
z′j,rpjr(r).
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As a result, Equation (8) holds. As for Equation (9), observe that∑
aj∈U
v′j · µj = v
′
iµi + v
′
rµr +
∑
j /∈{i,r},aj∈U
v′j · µj
= vrµr − viµr
di
dr
+
∑
j /∈{i,r},aj∈U
vj · µj
= vrµr + viµi − viµi − viµr
di
dr
+
∑
j /∈{i,r},aj∈U
vj · µj
= −viµi − viµr
di
dr
+
∑
aj∈U
vj · µj
≥ −viµi − viµr
di
dr
+ α
∑
aj∈U
vj
= −viµi − viµr
di
dr
+ α · vi + α · vr + α
∑
j /∈{i,r},aj∈U
vj
= −viµi − viµr
di
dr
+ α · vi +
(
α · v′r + α · vi
di
dr
)
+ α · v′i + α
∑
j /∈{i,r},aj∈U
vj
= −viµi − viµr
di
dr
+ α · vi + α · vi
di
dr
+ α
∑
aj∈U
v′j
= vi
(
−µi − µr
di
dr
+ α+ α
di
dr
)
+ α
∑
aj∈U
v′j
= vi
(
di − dr
di
dr
)
+ α
∑
aj∈U
v′j
= α
∑
aj∈U
v′j ;
hence, Equation (9) holds. Finally, vi+vr+zi,r = v
′
i+v
′
r+z
′
i,r while all other coefficients
are left unchanged; thus Equation (10) holds as well.
2. drdi <
vi
vr
: the analysis is similar to the previous case and hence omitted.
3. drdi =
vi
vr
: the analysis is similar to the first case and hence omitted.
This concludes the proof.
7 Omitted Proofs from Section 3.3
Proof of Proposition 1. We need to show that Inequality (2) holds for every history h. Since
FEE operates in phases, it would be convenient to divide the arguments into these three phases,
according to which phase h belongs.
• Exploration phase: the recommendation is based on the action of π∗, the optimal policy of
the GMDP in Subsection 3.1. If h is the empty history, then it is translated to s0, and π
∗
19
selects a1 w.p. 1. Otherwise, due to Equation (3) the action space of the GMDP is restricted
to distributions over the unobserved arms with expectation greater or equal to the observed
value R1. As a result, in both cases Inequality (2) holds.
• Experience phase: in this phase, FEE (h) is a distribution over two arms, r˜ and i, with Rr˜
greater than the obtained value R1 of arm a1. Further, Xi > Rr˜ with positive probability, or
otherwise arm ai would have been discarded (Lines 11–13). If, in addition, µi ≥ R1, then the
If sentence in Line 15 would select arm ai with probability 1, satisfying Inequality (2). On
the other hand, if µi < R1, then FEE selects arm ai w.p.
Rr˜−R1
Rr˜−µi
, and ar˜ with the remaining
probability (Lines 14–20); hence expected value of FEE (h) is
µi ·
Rr˜ −R1
Rr˜ − µi
+Rr˜
(
1−
Rr˜ −R1
Rr˜ − µi
)
,
which is greater or equal to R1.
• Exploit phase: in this phase FEE (h) is a deterministic selection of one arm — the most
rewarding one. Since the value of arm a1, R1 was observed before (as mentioned for the
exploration phase), the arm ai∗ selected in Line 20, satisfies Ri∗ > Ri.
One more property FEE exhibits is IC. The next theorem shows that when there are enough
agents, the best action of each agent is to accept FEE’s recommendation. To present it, we introduce
the following quantity δ. Let δi = Pr(∀i
′ ∈ [K] \ {i} : Xi > Xi′). In words, δi is the probability
that arm ai is superior to all other arms. Clearly, if δi = 0 for some i, we can safely ignore that
arm and never explore it; therefore, δi > 0 for every arm ai. Finally, let δ = mini∈[K] δi. Theorem
2 implies that if there are poly(H,K, 1δ ) agents, then FEE is IC.
Proof of Theorem 2. To prove the theorem, we need to show that whenever an agent is recom-
mended arm ar, her best response is to select arm ar. We focus on an arbitrary agent, and present
the analysis from her point of view. In addition, if r = 1, either she is the first agent to arrive at
the system or no better arm was discovered, resulting in a1 being a best response. Otherwise, r 6= 1.
We define the following events: let Errec be the event indicating that FEE recommends arm ar to
the agent; Eropen indicates whether arm ar was recommended to some agent; and E
r
opt indicates
whether ar is an optimal arm. All of these events are defined w.r.t. the distribution over histories
and the agent arrival distribution. Due to the uniform arrival distribution, the probability of Errec
matches the proportion of agents who are recommended arm ar. We proceed by analyzing the odds
of being recommended ar. Due to the definition of ǫ and the way FEE works when it observed a
superior arm,
Pr
(
Eropt | E
r
open
)
≥ δ, Pr
(
Eropt | E
r
open
)
≤ 1− δ. (12)
Next, we present a lemma that gives a large deviation bound on the number of agents needed for
the experience phase.
Lemma 3. Let Q(ǫ) = max{2KH, 2H2 ln 1ǫ}. The experience phase terminates after Q(ǫ) agents
w.p. of at least 1− ǫ.
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The proof of Lemma 3 and other claims we use in this lemma appear just after the end of this
proof. For simplicity, denote Q = Q(ǫ). Conditioning on Eropen, arm ar is either recommended
exactly once (in case its reward is observed to be inferior to another arm during the execution), or
several times. The latter can only happen if Rr > R1 and arm ar is used by FEE to explore other,
unobserved arms. In this case, Lemma 3 implies that would not happen more than Q times, w.h.p.
As a result,
Pr(Errec | E
r
opt, E
r
open) ≤ (1− ǫ)
Q+ 1
n
+ ǫ
n
n
≤
Q+ 1 + ǫn
n
. (13)
Moreover,
Observation 1. For every history h such that Eropt, E
r
open occur, if FEE already reached the exploit
phase (Line 20) under h, then Pr(FEE(h) = ar) = 1.
Due to Observation 1, we also conclude that
Pr(Errec | E
r
opt, E
r
open) ≥ (1− ǫ)
n−Q−K
n
. (14)
We now analyze the ratio between the probability of arm ar being optimal and the probability that
it is not, given Errec. We have
Pr(Eropt | E
r
rec, E
r
open)
Pr(Eropt | E
r
rec, E
r
open)
=
Pr(Errec,E
r
opt,E
r
open)
Pr(Errec,E
r
open)
Pr(Errec,E
r
opt,E
r
open)
Pr(Errec,E
r
open)
=
Pr(Errec, E
r
opt, E
r
open)
Pr(Errec, E
r
opt, E
r
open)
(15)
=
Pr(Eropen) Pr(E
r
opt | E
r
open) Pr(E
r
rec | E
r
open, E
r
opt)
Pr(Eropen) Pr(E
r
opt | E
r
open) Pr(E
r
rec | E
r
open, E
r
opt)
.
Using the bounds from Equations (12),(13) and (14) on Equation (15), we get
Pr(Eropt | E
r
rec, E
r
open)
Pr(Eropt | E
r
rec, E
r
open)
≥
δ(1− ǫ)n−Q−Kn
(1− δ)Q+1+ǫnn
,
and by rearranging we obtain
Pr(Eropt | E
r
rec, E
r
open) ≥ Pr(E
r
opt | E
r
rec, E
r
open)
δ(1 − ǫ)(n−Q−K)
(1− δ)(Q + 1 + ǫn)
. (16)
Next, we bound the expected difference between the reward of arm ar and that of an arbitrary arm
ai, with i 6= r. We have
E(Xr −Xi | E
r
rec) = E(Xr −Xi | E
r
rec, E
r
open)
= E(Xr −Xi | E
r
rec, E
r
open, E
r
opt) Pr(E
r
opt | E
r
rec, E
r
open) (17)
+ E(Xr −Xi | E
r
rec, E
r
open, E
r
opt) Pr(E
r
opt | E
r
rec, E
r
open)
≥ 1 · Pr(Eropt | E
r
rec, E
r
open)−H · Pr(E
r
opt | E
r
rec, E
r
open).
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By plugging in the bound obtained in Equation (16) to Equation (17) we get
E(Xr −Xi | E
r
rec) ≥ Pr(E
r
opt | E
r
rec, E
r
open)
(
δ(1 − ǫ)(n−Q−K)
(1− δ)(Q+ 1 + ǫn)
−H
)
. (18)
Ultimately, since
Observation 2. Let ǫ = δ4H and Q = max{2KH, 2H
2 ln 4Hδ }. If n ≥
6HQ
δ , it holds that
δ(1 − ǫ)(n−Q−K)
(1− δ)(Q + 1 + ǫn)
≥ H.
The proof is completed by combining Observation 2 with Equation (18) to show that E(Xr−Xi |
Errec) ≥ 0 for every arm ai.
Proof of Lemma 3. Let Z denote the number of agents receiving recommendations in the ex-
perience phase (Lines 16 and 19). The proof is based on two observations: first, we show that
Z is first-order stochastically dominated by an easy-to-analyze random variable. Then, we use a
concentration bound to complete the proof.
Observation 3. For every z ∈ N,
Pr
(
NBin(K,
1
H
) ≥ z
)
) ≥ Pr(Z ≥ z).
Moreover, using Hoeffding’s inequality we have
Claim 2. Let ǫ > 0, K,H ∈ N, and let Q = max{2KH, 2H2 ln 1ǫ} . It holds that
Pr
(
NBin(K,
1
H
) ≥ Q
)
≤ ǫ.
By combining Observation 3 and Claim 2, we get
Pr(Z ≥ Q) ≤ Pr(NBin(K,
1
H
) ≥ Q) ≤ ǫ
This completes the proof of this lemma.
Proof of Observation 1. To see why Observation 1 holds, recall that if Eropen occurs, then FEE
revealed Rr. Moreover, reaching Line 20 suggests that the experience phase is over; therefore, the
rewards of all arms are revealed. Finally, since Eropt holds, FEE will pick it with probability 1.
Proof of Observation 2. First, notice that ǫ < 12 and Q > K; thus,
δ(1 − ǫ)(n−Q−K)
(1− δ)(Q+ 1 + ǫn)
≥
δ
2(n− 2Q)
(2Q+ ǫn)
. (19)
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It suffices to show that the right-hand side of Equation (19) is greater or equal to H. Now,
δ
2(n − 2Q)
(2Q+ ǫn)
≥ H ⇔
δ
2
(n− 2Q) ≥ H(2Q+ ǫn)⇔
δn
2
− δQ ≥ 2HQ+ ǫHn
⇔
δn
2
− ǫHn ≥ 2HQ+ δQ⇔ n
(
δ
2
− ǫH
)
≥ 2HQ+ δQ⇔ n ≥
Q(2H + δ)(
δ
2 − ǫH
) . (20)
Inserting the values of ǫ and Q, we argue that the statement holds as long as
n ≥
max{2KH, 2H2 ln 4Hδ }(2H + δ)(
δ
2 −
δ
4HH
) = 4max{2KH, 2H2 ln 4Hδ }(2H + δ)
δ
. (21)
To conclude the proof, recall that n ≥ 12HQδ ; hence
n ≥
12H max{2KH, 2H2 ln 4Hδ }
δ
≥
4max{2KH, 2H2 ln 4Hδ }(2H + δ)
δ
;
thus, Equation (21) holds.
Proof of Claim 2. First, observe that
Pr
(
NBin(K,
1
H
) ≥ Q
)
= Pr
(
Bin(Q,
1
H
) ≤ K
)
. (22)
Next, notice that k ≤ Q2H ; thus,
Eq.(22) ≤ Pr
(
Bin(Q,
1
H
) ≤
Q
2H
)
. (23)
By using the multiplicative version of the Chernoff Bound, we get that
Eq.(23) ≤ e−
Q
2H2 . (24)
Recall that Q ≥ 2H2 ln 1ǫ ; therefore,
e
− Q
2H2 ≤ e−
2H2 ln 1ǫ
2H2 = ǫ.
Proof of Observation 3. The exploration phase of FEE is based on π∗. Once π∗ reaches a
terminal state, there are two options:
• The terminate state exhibits β = R1. In this case, the statement of the If sentence in Line 7
is false, and there is no need for experience. Consequently, Z = 0 w.p. 1 and the statement
holds.
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• The terminate state exhibits β > R1. In this case, FEE enters the While loop in Line 8. In
each iteration of the While loop, either the size of U decreases by 1 (Lines 12 and 16), or
stays the same (Line 19). The statement in Line 19 will only execute if the arm ai selected
in Line 10 satisfies µi < R1, otherwise the If condition in Line 15 would execute; hence, the
probability of executing Line 19 is bounded by
Pr
(
Uni(0, 1) ≥
Ri˜ −R1
Ri˜ − µi
)
≤ Pr
(
Uni(0, 1) ≥
1
H
)
= 1−
1
H
.
This applies for every iteration of the While loop. Recall that there are at most K − 2 arms
needed to be explored, and hence the statement holds.
7.1 Optimality
Proof of Theorem 3. To facilitate the proof, we introduce the following definitions: given a
mechanism M and a history h, we say that M is fruitless w.r.t. h if M(h) gives a positive
probability to at least one observed arm ai, i 6= 1, with Ri ≤ R1, i.e., reward that is at most
R1 (notice that it implies that a1 and ai were observed). In addition, we say that a history h is
auspicious if an action with reward greater than that of a1 is observed under h.
We are ready to begin the proof. Let M be an arbitrary mechanism, and for the sake of the
proof fix the number of agents, and only consider histories of length of at most n. The proof
contains three steps. In Step 1 we slightly modify M , resulting in a new mechanism M (1) that
attains a social welfare at least as high as that of M , and is still EAIR. In Step 2, we modify M (1)
to use an oracle whenever it reaches an auspicious history. As we show, the resulting mechanism,
M (2) has an improved social welfare, SW (M (2)) ≥ SW (M (1)). Finally, in Step 3 we show that the
social welfare of M (2) is at most W (π∗, s0).
Step 1: In this step we construct a modification ofM with at least the same social welfare, which
is not fruitless on any history h. We define a mechanism M (1) that receives M as a black box and
uses it for recommendations. M (1) is defined as follows:
1. Let h˜ be the empty history. Act as M(h˜) and update h˜ accordingly.
2. While the length of h˜ is less than n:
2.1 Draw ai ∼M(h˜). If the reward of ai was already observed and Ri ≤ R1, recommend a1
and set h˜ = h˜⊕ (ai, Ri). Else, act as M(h˜) and update h˜ accordingly.
It is straightforward to see that M (1) satisfies the EAIR condition, and that SW (M (1)) ≥ SW (M).
Step 2: In this step, we present a non-feasible mediatorM (2) that modifies the wayM (1) operates
on auspicious histories. M (2) uses an oracle that hints the best arm.
More concretely, M (2) is defined as follows:
1. Let h˜ be the empty history. Act as M (1)(h˜) and update h˜ accordingly.
2. While h˜ is not auspicious:
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2.1 Act as M (1)(h˜) and update h˜ accordingly.
3. If h˜ is auspicious:
3.1 Use an oracle to reveal the best arm, a∗. From here on, recommend a∗ to all users.
Notice that M (2) is EAIR for every non-auspicious history, but not EAIR in general; for this
reason, it is not feasible. Moreover, it holds that SW (M (2)) ≥ SW (M (1)).
Step 3: The final step is to claim that the resulting mechanism M (2) cannot get more than the
optimal value of the GMDP in Section 3. However, the GMDP does not allow selecting a1, so we
have to have some minor modifications.
This step is structured as follows. First, formally define a modified version of the GMDP
presented in Section 3, with minor modifications. We call the new GMDP Repeated GMDP, or
R-GMDP for abbreviation to distinguish between the two. Then, we show that the best achievable
value in the R-GMDP is exactly W (π∗, s0). The final step is mapping M
(2) obtained in Step 2 to
a non-stationary strategy in the R-GMDP, which achieves at least as as the social welfare of M (2),
that is SW (M (2)). The claim then follows since the policy constructed using M (2) cannot obtain
more that W (π∗, s0).
Consider the following R-GMDP: 6
• S is a finite set of states. Each state s is a pair (O,U), where O ⊆ {(a, c) | a ∈ A, c ∈ H} is
the set of arm–reward pairs that have been observed so far. U ⊆ A is the set of arms not yet
explored. The initial state is thus s0 = (∅, A). For every non-empty set of pairs O we define α(O)
to be the reward observed for arm a1 (that can be obtained several times, as we explain shortly),
and β(O) = maxc:∃a,(a,c)∈O c to be the maximal reward observed.
• A =
⋃
s∈S As is an infinite set of actions. For each s = (O,U) ∈ S, As is defined as follows:
1. If s = s0, then As0 = ∆({a1}): i.e., a deterministic selection of a1.
2. Else, if α(O) < β(O), then As = ∅.
3. Otherwise, As is a subset of ∆(U ∪ {a1}), such that p ∈ As if and only if∑
ai∈U∪{a1}
p(ai)µai ≥ α(O).
We denote by ST the set of terminal states, namely ST = {s ∈ S | As = ∅}.
• P is the transition probability function. Let s = (O,U) ∈ S, and let s′ = (O′, U ′) such that
O′ = O ∪ {(ai, c)} and U
′ = U \ {ai} for some ai ∈ U ∪ {a1}, c ∈ [H].
Then, the transition probability from s to s′ given an action p is defined by
P(s′|s,p) =
{
p(ai) Pr(Xi = c) ai ∈ U
1c=α(O) ai = a1
.
If s′ is some other state that does not meet the conditions above, then let P(s′|s,p) = 0 for every
p ∈ As.
6The crucial difference between R-GMDP and GMDP is in the action space and the transition probabilities,
colored in red for readability.
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• R : ST → R is the reward function, defined on terminal states only. For each terminal state
s = (O,U) ∈ ST ,
R(s) =
{
α(O) α(O) = β(O)
E
[
max
{
β(O),maxai′∈U Xi′)
}]
α(O) < β(O).
.
Next, we prove that there exists an optimal policy for the R-GMDP with a significantly reduced
support.
Lemma 4. For every policy π for R-GMDP, there exists a stationary policy π′ such that
1. π′(s) = π′(s′) for every pair of states s = (O,U) and s′ = (O′, U) with α(O) = α(O′) and
β(O) = β(O′).
2. For every state s, W (π′, s) ≥W (π, s).
The proof of the lemma is identical to the proof of Lemma 1 and hence omitted. Lemma 4
suggests that we can focus on strategies that distinguish between states based on U,α(O) and β(O)
solely. The reduced state space does allows self loop by selecting a1, without having any effect on
the reward. It is thus straightforward to see that an optimal strategy that ignores a1 exists, with
a reward of exactly W (π∗, s0).
Notice that M (2) defines a non-stationary policy π for the R-GMDP, by mimicking the actions
(distributions) π selects. When M (2) gets to an auspicious history or could not explore anymore,
the policy π gets to a terminal state and obtains a reward. Each time M (2) directs an agent, that
agent gets at most the maximal reward M (2) discovered; hence, SW (M (2)) is less or equal to the
reward obtained by that non-stationary policy π, which is at most W (π∗, s0).
This completes the proof of the theorem.
Proof of Lemma 2. Let N1, N2 denote the r.v. representing the number of agents in the explore
and experience phases, respectively. Notice that the definition of social welfare given in Equation
1 can be interpreted as
SW (FEE) =
1
n

E
(
N1+N2∑
l=1
XM(hl)
)
+ E

 n∑
l′′=N1+N2+1
XM(hl′′ )



 . (25)
Observe that every agent in the explore and experience phases obtains the reward of arm a1 in
expectation. Moreover, every agent in the exploit phase obtains W (π∗, s0) in expectation; hence,
Equation (25) can be rearranged as
SW (FEE) =
1
n

E
(
N1+N2∑
l′=1
X1
)
+ E

 n∑
l′′=N1+N2+1
W (π∗, s0)




=
1
n
(µ1 E (N1 +N2) +W (π
∗, s0)E (n−N1 −N2))
=W (π∗, s0)−
1
n
E (N1 +N2) (W (π
∗, s0)− µ1).
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To finalize the proof, recall that N1 ≤ K almost surely since there are K arms that could be
explored, and on every step in the exploration phase exactly one arm gets explored. Moreover, due
to Observation 3 it holds that E(N2) ≤ KH; hence,
SW (FEE) ≥W (π∗, s0)−
1
n
(K +KH) (W (π∗, s0)− µ1).
Proposition 7. A mechanism that first explores all arms and then exploits the best arm observed
is IC and asymptotically optimal.
Proof of Proposition 7. Showing asymptotical optimality is trivial. The proof of being IC goes
along the lines of Theorem 2 and hence omitted.
Proof of Proposition 3. MEPIR trivially satisfies the EPIR condition and the arguments for
MEPIR being IC are similar to those in Theorem 2. Asymptotic optimality follows from observing
that given any value R1 observed for a1, MEPIR simply explores all non-inferior arms, which is a
super-set of all the arms that could be explored by an EPIR mechanism; thus, after at most K
stages it exploits the highest possible reward achievable by an EPIR mechanism, and as a result
MEPIR is asymptotically optimal.
Proof of Proposition 2. Let X1 be such that Pr(X1 = 1) = 1, and for every i such that 2 ≤ i ≤
K let
Xi =
{
0 w.p. 1− 1H + ǫ
H w.p. 1H − ǫ
,
for a small positive constant ǫ. Clearly, µ1 = 1 while µi < 1 for 2 ≤ i ≤ K; hence, OPTEAIR = 1.
On the other hand,
OPT = E( max
1≤i≤K
Xi) = Pr( max
2≤i≤K
Xi = H)H + Pr( max
2≤i≤K
Xi = 0) · 1
=
(
1− (1−
1
H
+ ǫ)K−1
)
H + (1−
1
H
+ ǫ)K−1.
Taking ǫ to zero, we get that OPT is arbitrarily close to(
1− (1−
1
H
)K−1
)
H + (1−
1
H
)K−1 = H
(
1− (1−
1
H
)K
)
.
Finally, we use the fact that e−x ≥ (1 − xn)
n whenever |x| ≤ n. By setting n = K and x = KH , we
conclude that e−
K
H ≥ (1− 1H )
K ; therefore,
OPT
OPTEAIR
≥ H
(
1− e−
K
H
)
.
Proposition 8. Let K,H ∈ N such that K ≥ 2, and let Xi be uniformly distributed on the set [H]
for 1 ≤ i ≤ K. It holds that OPTOPTEAIR ≤
8
7 .
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Proof of Proposition 8. Assume for simplicity that H is even. First, by simple probability tricks
one can show that
OPT = E( max
1≤i≤K
Xi) =
K
K + 1
H.
Second, notice that max2≤i≤K µi =
H
2 ; thus,
OPTEAIR = Pr(X1 >
H
2
)E(X1 | X1 >
H
2
) + Pr(X1 ≤
H
2
)E( max
1≤i≤K
Xi | X1 ≤
H
2
)
≥
1
2
3H
4
+
1
2
E( max
2≤i≤K
Xi)
=
3H
8
+
1
2
K − 1
K
H.
By standard manipulations we obtain
OPT
OPTEAIR
≤
K2
7
8K
2 + 38K −
1
2
,
which achieves 1615 for K = 2 and is monotonically increasing for K ≥ 3; hence, the claim is proven
by taking K to infinity.
Proof of Proposition 4. Let X1,X2, . . . XK such that
X1 =
{
1 w.p. 1− 1H−1 − ǫ
H w.p. 1H−1 + ǫ
, X2 =
{
2 w.p. 1 , ∀3 ≤ i ≤ K : Xi =
{
0 w.p. 1− 1H + ǫ
H w.p. 1H − ǫ
.
It holds that
OPTEPIR = H
(
1
H − 1
+ ǫ
)
+ 2
(
1−
1
H − 1
− ǫ
)
.
On the other hand,
OPTEAIR = H
(
1
H − 1
+ ǫ
)
+ 2
(
1−
1
H
+ ǫ
)K−2
+H
(
1−
(
1−
1
H
+ ǫ
)K−2)
.
Taking ǫ to zero, we get
OPTEAIR
OPTEPIR
=
H
(
1
H−1
)
+ 2
(
1− 1H
)K−2
+H
(
1−
(
1− 1H
)K−2)
3− 1H−1
≥
(H + 2)
(
1−
(
1− 1H
)K−2)
3
≥
H + 2
3
(
1− e−
K
H
)
.
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